№ 5 - 2006
Shirikov A.S.
Powers as a Stake in Political Game: Genesis of Legislative Rules in the Sphere of Regional Budgetary Process

In the article, an attempt is made to draw an outline of one of possible approaches to explaining the institutional choice in Russian regions. It was the so far poorly explored problem of division of powers in the regional budgetary process that served as empirical material for testing of the theoretical model. Proceeding from the postulates of the institutional choice theory, the author has formulated a number of hypotheses relative to genesis of formal rules affirming interaction of legislative and executive powers in the budgetary process, and has verified them by methods of statistics. Having confirmed applicability of the theoretical theses about the institutional choice, the analysis he carried out has allowed to reveal Russian specific circumstances related to the basic institutional-political context of the relations between the two branches of power. The research has demonstrated that the low level of organizational and political autonomy of regional assemblies impedes efficient management of the legislative process, in consequence of which the strategy of restricting the governor is implemented but fragmentarily and occasionally.